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THE SUPREME COURT SCULPTS A DEFINITION... IS
IT A WORK FOR HIRE?
I. INTRODUCTION
For the photographer who is asked to take portraits of the British
royal children,1 for the computer programmer asked to create an educa-
tional software system for a software firm,2 or for the architect who de-
signs a building for a contractor,3 the issue of copyright ownership has
been ambiguous. These parties are not formal salaried employees who
know that copyright ownership will vest in their employer. Nor is the
type of work they create specifically recognized by the law as being spe-
cially ordered or commissioned. If the issue of copyright comes up, and
no agreements have been reached, the creators and their hiring parties
have been uncertain as to who owns the copyright. To resolve the ambi-
guity in these situations, Congress attempted to establish boundaries for
the definition of work for hire4 with the 1976 Revision of the Copyright
Act (the "Revised Act"). But Congress never expressly defined who is
considered an employee within the construction of the work for hire
definition.
The questions concerning the definition of work for hire are of cru-
cial importance because when a work falls within its boundaries, Section
201 of the Revised Act views the employer as the author of that work.5
Therefore, before reaching the application of Section 201, courts have
been called on by hiring parties and the parties producing the works, to
determine whether the party producing the work falls into the work for
hire definition of the Revised Act.6 Section 101, which generally defines
1. Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. Globe International, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
2. Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 949 (1986).
3. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
4. The phrase "works for hire" will be used, instead of the more cumbersome statutory
terminology "works made for hire".
5. "In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title... and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the rights com-
prised in the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
6. The definition for work for hire states a "work made for hire" is--l) a work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
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the terms used in the Revised Act,7 appears explicit in its definition of
work for hire. In Section 101(1) of the Revised Act, work for hire is
defined as work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employ-
ment, and in Section 101(2) of the Revised Act work for hire is defined as
specially commissioned works in nine expressly enumerated areas.' It is
the use of the term "employee" in Section 101(1) that has been the sub-
ject of much debate.
The circuits are split over the definition of "employee" as it is used
in the Revised Act. The Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits adopted
variations of an "actual control" test to determine whether a party is an
employee for purposes of the work for hire provision.9 The Fifth Circuit
has defined "employee" within its common law agency meaning for pur-
poses of determining copyright ownership.' 0 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
recently ruled that only formal salaried employees are considered "em-
ployees" under the work for hire definition." It is clear from the various
definitions that a party who produces a single piece or multiple pieces for
another party, may find herself in a dispute as to her status as an em-
ployee or an independent contractor.12 The determination of her status,
which in turn determines her ownership rights, will vary depending on
the circuit in which she is raising the issue.
The Supreme Court decision in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. James Earl Reid 3 was anxiously anticipated. Parties on both
sides of the work for hire disputes hoped it would establish uniformity in
the copyright rules of ownership as applied to work for hire. The amicus
briefs submitted by parties representing both free-lancers and the hiring
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Hereinafter references to Section 101 of the Revised Act
will concern only the work for hire definition.
8. See supra note 6 for the text of U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
982 (2d Cir. 1984); Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410
(4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
11. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
12. The term independent contractor is not found in the statute, and clause (2) of the work
for hire definition appears to be the only clause that addresses works done by independent
contractors. Debate has persisted as to whether the clause is all inclusive or if clause (1) can
potentially apply to independent contractors. See infra notes 98-101, 182-84 and accompany-
ing text.
13. 652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
- U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
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parties show the importance of this decision.' 4 For many free-lancers,
the final decision in Reid has limited impact because the legislature care-
fully provided for the manner in which their works would be handled by
the express enumerations in Section 101(2).'-' But for artists like James
Earl Reid ("Reid") the decision has a substantial impact. 6 Sculptures
are not one of the enumerated works included in Section 101(2) and,
therefore, an artist like Reid loses copyright under the Revised Act only
if he is considered an employee under Section 101(1). Some of Reid's
counterparts have had their status defined as "employee" under Section
101(1) and the hiring party has obtained copyright to the product that he
could not reach under Section 101(2). As of June 5, 1989, the term "em-
ployee" has been defined by the Supreme Court. Now only works by
free-lancers who meet the common law agency definition of employee
will have their works fall into the ambit of Section 101(1).'7 After the
determination of whether the piece is a work for hire, ownership under
Section 201 can be considered. 8
II. COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE V. REID
This case centers around a statue depicting homelessness that was
commissioned by Mitch Snyder of the Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence ("CCNV").' 9 In 1985, CCNV determined they would participate
in the Christmas Pageant of Peace held in Washington, D.C.20 To dram-
atize the plight of the homeless, the members of CCNV envisioned a
sculpture representing the traditional nativity scene, however they would
14. Groner, Why Big Business Likes Mitch Snyder, Legal Times, June 16, 1989, at 7 (lists
names of some of the parties submitting amicus briefs, and organizations they represent).
15. See supra note 6.
16. In addition to artists, the decision on work for hire will have an impact on writers,
photographers, designers, composers, and computer programmers. The decision also effects
the parties using their works, which includes the publishing, advertising and music industry.
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2171 (1989)
("Reid I").
17. Id. at 2178. Whether this interpretation will be retroactive to the time the Revised Act
was enacted or whether it will be prospective has not yet been determined. See, Ossola, High
Court Decides Who 'Works for Hire,' Legal Times, June 12, 1989, at 20 (discussion regarding
the implications of a prospective or retroactive application of the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of work for hire).
18. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2178.
19. The Community for Creative Non-Violence is a Washington, D.C. based non-profit
organization established to care for the welfare of the homeless. Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1988)("Reid IF").
20. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.D.C.
1987)("Reid F").
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replace the traditional Holy Family with a black, homeless family.2' To
complete the work, the base for the statue would be constructed to ap-
pear as a steam grate with simulated smoke rising and swirling around
the family.22 CCNV decided to title the work "Third World America"
and the legend on the base would read "and still there is no room at the
inn."23
In October, 1985, Snyder24 contacted James Earl Reid, a Baltimore
sculptor, to ask him to produce the desired work.25 After two phone
conversations, the parties agreed that Reid would sculpt the figures as
envisioned by CCNV.26 Reid suggested that the sculpture be cast in
bronze at a cost of $100,000 and taking six to eight months to complete.
Due to time and budget constraints the parties agreed instead that the
statue would be made with a synthetic material sufficiently durable to
withstand the elements.27 Reid agreed that the project would cost from
$12-15,000 for the materials and assistants, and he would provide his
services at no cost to CCNV.28 Neither party discussed copyright
ownership.29
Reid commenced work on the project by drafting sketches of the
figures in various poses. On November 1, 1985, CCNV paid an advance
to Reid and asked for sketches of the figures.30 Reid sent Snyder
sketches of the proposed sculpture, with the figures in the traditional
pose used in nativity displays.31 A short time later, Reid asked Snyder if
he knew of a family that would be appropriate models for the sculpture.
Snyder took Reid to a Washington shelter for the homeless to view a
black family with a newborn child. While Reid felt he could work with
21. Id. The family would be black since most of the homeless in Washington are black.
Id.
22. Id. CCNV contacted special effects people in Hollywood to provide the equipment to
generate the steam. Id. at 1455.
23. Reid I, 652 F. Supp. at 1454.
24. Mitch Snyder acted as CCNV's agent and trustee throughout negotiations and his
name was on the copyright form as author of the work. Reid II, 846 F.2d at 1488.
25. Reid I, 652 F. Supp. at 1454.
26. Id. Reid was very enthusiastic about the proposal when the project began. Id.
27. Reid agreed to use "Design Cast 62," a synthetic material, that would withstand the
elements and could be tinted bronze. Id.
28. Reid I, 652 F. Supp. at 1454. A portion of the payment was to be used by Reid to pay
the assistants he needed throughout the project. CCNV made these payments in installments.
Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2169.
29. Reid I, 652 F. Supp. at 1455. Reid claimed that he did state that he reserved his full
copyright rights, and that he would retain artistic control. Id. at 1454-55 n.3.
30. Id. at 1455.
31. There is a dispute as to why the sketches were requested. Snyder asserted that it was
for his approval and Reid asserted that sketches were requested to use for fundraising, and
therefore the poses assumed were not necessarily intended for the sculpture. Idl at 1455 n.4.
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the child, he rejected using the parents.32 At this time Reid and Snyder
toured the Washington area inhabited by many homeless people. During
the tour Snyder pointed out the people lying on the grates.33 Reid's ini-
tial sketches showed upright figures, but following this visit to Washing-
ton, all new sketches depicted figures reclining.34
Through November and the first two weeks of December, Reid and
his assistants worked exclusively on the sculpture.35 The deadline for
completion was December 12, 1985, but the sculpture was not completed
at that time. Snyder initially demanded the sculpture be delivered imme-
diately, but Reid explained the piece could be harmed and Snyder gave
Reid more time to complete a "first class work."36 On December 24,
1985, Reid delivered the completed sculpture to the Ellipse in Washing-
ton D. C.3 7 At that time, CCNV had the pedestal attached.
3
1
Organizers of the Christmas pageant, for which the sculpture had
been constructed, did not think the political implications of the sculpture
were appropriate for their event and would not accept the sculpture into
their pageant. 39  Instead, CCNV decided to place "Third World
America" on display near the pageant site.' ° After one month on dis-
play, the sculpture was returned to Reid for minor repairs.4"
Following the return of the sculpture to Reid, Snyder expressed a
desire to take the piece on a multi-city tour to raise funds for the home-
less.42 Reid rejected that idea because he felt the material used for the
work could not withstand the rigors of the scheduled tour.4 3 Snyder
would not allot any more money to upgrade the sculpture or pay for a
32. Reid 1, 652 F. Supp. at 1455. Reid later chose to use his photographer and a female
acquaintance as models for the parent figures. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id Whether Snyder pointed out the position of the people on the grates and thus the
sculpture took on that pose or Reid was aware of that all along is not clear, however the
district court felt it was an idea initiated by Snyder and the Supreme Court appears to accept
that view. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2169.
35. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2169. Reid had complete discretion as to his choice
in hiring and paying assistants. Id. at 2179.
36. Reid I, 652 F. Supp. at 1455.
37. Id. Before Reid delivered the statue, he had inscribed the copyright symbol and his
name underneath the title of the work. Id. at 1455 n.7.
38. Id. CCNV had complete responsibility for the preparation of the pedestal. Reid If,
846 F.2d at 1487. In the respondent's brief Reid asserts that he provided the sketch and details
for the pedestal, however that was not the focal point of the case. Respondents Brief, No. 88-
293, at 3.
39. Reid 1, 652 F. Supp. at 1455 n.6.
40. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2170.
41. Id
42. Reid 1, 652 F. Supp. at 1456.
43. Id.
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master mold, and when he asked that the sculpture be returned to
CCNV, Reid refused." After refusing to return the sculpture, on March
20, 1986, Reid filed a certificate of copyright for "Third World America"
and announced a tour for the statue that would be less arduous than that
proposed by Snyder.45 In response, on May 21, 1986, Snyder filed a
copyright certificate on the same work.
46
On June 2, 1986, CCNV filed a complaint against Reid seeking re-
turn of the sculpture and determination of the copyright ownership.47
Determination of copyright ownership depended on whether the sculp-
ture was a work for hire as defined by the Revised Act.
III. HISTORY OF THE WORK FOR HIRE PROVISION
OF THE REVISED ACT
In 1909 Congress established the first Copyright Act (the "Original
Act").4" It had broad provisions that fostered a large body of judicial
interpretation and business practices.4 9 However, as time progressed,
general changes in the nature of works produced and increasingly diver-
gent common law interpretations of the Original Act required that statu-
tory changes be made.' ° Many revision bills were introduced and
rejected before Congress began work on the Revised Act.51
In 1961, the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress, completed
its studies in anticipation of a general revision to the Copyright Law. At
that time, the Copyright Office issued its first Copyright Law Revision
44. Id.
45. Id. When Reid presented the sculpture to CCNV he had inscribed a copyright symbol
on the base to assert his claim of copyright. However the court found that Reid's first claim
was asserted on December 24, 1985. Id. at 1455 n.7.
46. Reid II, 846 F.2d at 1488.
47. Id. Since actual ownership of the sculpture itself was not a contested issue, upon pre-
liminary injunction, the district court required that Reid deliver the work to CCNV. Reid I,
652 F. Supp. at 1456.
48. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by 1976 General
Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
49. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., I st Sess., ix (1961)[hereinaf-
ter 1961 GENERAL REVISION].
50. Id. at ix-x (1961); See Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 858 (1987); Fitzgibbon & Kendall, The Unicorn in the Courtroom: The
Concept of "Supervising and Directing" an Artistic Creation Is a Mythical Beast in the Copy-
right Law, 15 J ART MGMT & LAW 23 (Fall 1985).
51. 1961 GENERAL REVISION, supra note 48, at x Between 1924 and 1940 continuous
effort was made to revise the Original Act. While two bills were passed by the House in the
1930s, they were ultimately rejected primarily because of differences between the Berne Con-
vention and U.S. Law. Id.
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Report.52 This report, as the reports following it would do, highlighted
recommendations of the Copyright Office and addressed the views and
responses various parties had to the intended revisions." Testifying at
these hearings were authors, book, newspaper and music publishers, pho-
tographers, and representatives of the movie and television industries.
The numerous reports, hearings and bills to Congress led to the 1976
revision of the Copyright Act. In its final form, the Revised Act was a
comprehensive law reached after much compromise, which adopted cer-
tain common law doctrines and abrogated others.54
In the process of revising the Original Act, the work for hire provi-
sion was addressed in two areas. There was revision on both the area of
ownership of works for hire and on the actual definition of works for
hire. The question of ownership was debated by various parties, but in
the end the Revised Act remained consistent with the Original Act and
ownership vested in the employing party unless otherwise agreed to by
the parties.55 However, the definition of work for hire changed dramati-
cally through the course of the hearings and reports before Congress.
5 6
In the final revision, the work for hire definition was far more explicit
than the work for hire provision in the Original Act.57
52. Id. at iv.
53. Id. at iv-v.
54. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 857,
859 (1987).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). According to the Copyright Office, this was the most prac-
tical rule to follow. 1961 GENERAL REVISION, supra note 48, at 85. See, also, COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW AND DIScUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT, 15 (1964)[hereinafter
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3] The preliminary drafts for the revised Copyright law,
stated ownership would vest in the employer unless the parties agreed otherwise. Id. This
was disputed by many parties. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW RE-
VISION PART 2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 152, 393
(1963)[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 2]( testimony of John Schulman, Ameri-
can Patent Law Association, Committee on Copyright), 384 (testimony of Harriet F. Pilpel,
Society of Magazine Writers Society of Magazine Photographers, and Morton David
Goldberg); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on
the Judiciary House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 264 (1965)(statement of Leonard
Zissu, on Behalf of the Composers & Lyricists Guild of America). Other parties felt that
ownership vesting in the employer or hiring party was essential, and further that employers
should be deemed authors. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 2, supra at 358 (response by
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. to Register's Recommendation to Congress sup-
-ported intent of Register); Id. at 374 (statement by Melville B. Nimmer).
56. See infra notes 58-93 and accompanying text.
57. See infra note 91.
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A. The Definition of Work for Hire
The work for hire provision is a unique section of the Copyright
Laws that does not vest copyright ownership in the creator of the work.
5 8
Section 26 of the Original Act 9 stated that the employer would be con-
sidered the "author" of works by his employee for the purposes of copy-
right when there were works done for hire.' ° But since the terms
"employer," "employee" and "work for hire" were not defined in the
statute, courts were required to judicially define the terms.
61
In 1961, in its first report, the Copyright Office, through the Regis-
ter of Copyrights, recommended that the revision bill define the phrase
"works made for hire" as "works created for an employer by an em-
ployee within the regular scope of his employment., 62 This definition
recognized that courts had generally excluded commissioned works from
the work for hire provision, but because work for hire was an inexact
phrase it might be construed to include commissioned works.63 In re-
sponse to this new definition, the hiring parties argued that inclusion of
the phrase "regular scope of his employment" would serve to create
more problems than it solved.6' The interpretation of the term "regular"
as used in this context would be subject to confusion and therefore was
too ambiguous.65 It was further argued that the term "regular" would
create problems when people hired in one capacity performed functions
58. The Copyright Act provides generally "copyright in a work protected under this title
... vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
59. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (1909),
(repealed 1947). Section 62 of the 1909 Act ("Original Act") became § 26 of the 1947 codifica-
tion of the Original Act. 35 Stat. 1088; Pub. L. No. 281, ch. 391, § 26, 61 Stat. 652, 660 (1947)
(repealed 1976).
60. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 281, ch. 391, § 26 (1947).
61. The Second Circuit appears to have been the primary source for most interpretations
of the Copyright Provisions. Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978);
Goldberg & Bernstein, Work Made for Hire; Renewal Rights, N.Y.L.J., March 17, 1989, at 3.
See Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bergman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036; Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d
737, 744 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,
457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
62. 1961 GENERAL REVISION, supra note 49, at 88.
63. Id. at 86-87.
64. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 2, supra note 55, at 157 (testimony of Sidney Dia-
mond, London Records). The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., argued that to
change the definition would disrupt the body of law that had developed around the existing
phrase "work made for hire" and that was already an area in which there was a great deal of
difficulty in determining whether works met the definition. Id. at 359 (testimony of Edward
Sargoy of the Copyright Committee of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
65. Id. at 157.
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in capacities outside the "regular scope" of their employment."
Following the discussion on the 1961 General Revision Report, the
Copyright Office prepared a preliminary draft of provisions for a revised
copyright law ("Preliminary Draft"). 67 In a footnote, this draft provided
a new definition, "A 'work made for hire' [is] a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of the duties of his employment, but not in-
cluding a work made on special order or commission. "68 Additional de-
bate followed the presentation of the Preliminary Draft.69
Strong objections were lodged against this last phrase of the Prelimi-
nary Draft definition.7 0 Concern was expressed that if this provision re-
mained, parties who used free-lancers would be discouraged from using
them or would be forced to put people on payroll in order to ensure that
the hiring party had ownership rights. 71 The publishers argued that this
would force free-lancers, in industries that predominantly worked on a
special commission basis, to give up their preference and become
employees.
72
In response to these and other objections, the Copyright Revision
Bill of 1964 once again changed the definition of work for hire to "a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment, or a work
prepared on special order or commission if the parties expressly agree in
writing that it shall be considered a work made for hire."'73 The Register
of Copyright noted,
There are commissioned works, such as operas and serious mu-
sic, and various works of that sort, that most people would find
hard to accept as 'works made for hire.' But it is true, and I
think we have to accept the fact, that some works made on
special order or commission have been construed by the courts
as coming within the ambit of the 'works made for hire' con-
66. Id. at 159-60 (testimony of Joseph Dubin of Universal Pictures Co., Inc.). Limiting
work for hire to the "regular scope of employment" would thereby force hiring parties to
demand assignment of rights in the instances where an actor wrote lines in the course of film-
ing because that was beyond the regular scope of his employment. Id.
67. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3, supra note 55, at iii. The preliminary draft was
prepared after discussion in eight meetings by an advisory group of specialists convened by the
Register. Id.
68. Id. at 15.
69. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3, supra note 55, at iii.
70. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 5, 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND
COMMENTS. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 144-45 (1965)[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
PART 5] (statement by Barbara Ringer).
71. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3, supra note 55, at 259 (testimony by Horace S.
Manges of the American Book Publishers Council).
72. Id. See also Id. at 260-61 (testimony by John R. Peterson, American Bar Association).
73. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5, supra note 70, at 31 (1964 Revision Bill § 54).
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
cept under the present law [and therefore should be construed
as works made for hire].
74
In a prepared statement, the Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc. ("MPAA") approved the change, stating that the Regis-
ter's alteration of the definition showed "an appreciation of the practical
working problems of the motion picture and other industries" where
work for hire was crucial to the growth of the industry. 7" This change
allowed specially commissioned works to be considered works for hire,
while leaving room for the parties to negotiate. It was thus intended to
provide free-lancers, not considered employees, with the rights to retain
ownership, and at the same time give the parties commissioning the
works the ability to bargain for those rights.7 6
The revision, however, did not satisfy everyone. Authors were con-
cerned about the impact incorporating the phrase "works made on spe-
cial order or commission" into the definition would have on their
copyrights to their work.77 While not suggesting that authors were im-
provident, Mr. Karp, of the Authors League of America (the "ALA"),
rejected the Register's proposition. Mr. Karp believed that simply be-
cause specially commissioned works only met the definition if agreed to
by the parties, there was no presumptive advantage to the authors.78 He
stated "authors don't read contracts, '79 and that it was too easy to bury
a clause stating that a work was in fact a work for hire in the boilerplate
of contracts and the author would unwittingly transfer away his rights.8"
The ALA also argued that many authors would not have the economic
power to resist the terms of the contract.8 " The ALA suggested that the
74. Id. at 144-45 (statement by Barbara Ringer). Ms. Ringer noted that because works for
hire were excluded from the general guidelines regarding termination of the transfer of copy-
right ownership, the consequences of the definition became extremely important. Id. See also,
Id. at 10 (§ 16, 1964 Revision Bill, Termination of transfers of copyright ownership).
75. Id. at 301.
76. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5, supra note 70, at 145.
77. Id. at 147 (testimony by Irwin Karp of Authors League of America).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 147. This concern persisted. In 1982, during hearings on a bill proposing to
amend the Revised Act's work for hire provision, Mr. Karp reiterated the problems he saw
arising from the current definition. Mr. Karp voiced an even stronger objection to the pre-
sumption that § 101(2) gives free-lancers producing commissioned works the ability to negoti-
ate copyright ownership. Instead, he stated, the effect of this provision has been that
publishers say "as a condition for your selling us and our accepting the first serial right...
you must also tie in all your other rights." Definition of Work Madefor Hire in The Copyright
Act of 1976: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on S, 2044,
97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1982). Numerous contracts were also presented as evidence of the
alleged misuse of the work for hire provision. Id. at 24-33. S. 2044 was not ratified.
81. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5, supra note 70, at 239.
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work for hire provision should expressly state that work made on special
order or commission is excluded from the definition. 2 This would still
allow parties to negotiate, but there would be no statutory presumption
that ownership would transfer to the hiring party.
Witnesses representing screenwriters and composers urged that in-
stead of the work for hire definition granting authorship to employers,
ownership should be determined in a method similar to the "shop right"
doctrine used in patent law. 3 Application of the "shop right" doctrine
would allow the employee to retain all copyright ownership in the work.
The employer, however, would have "the right to use the employee's
work to the extent needed for purposes of his regular business," and the
employee's use could not compete with that of the employer.8 4 This
would protect the employees or commissioned artists from losing all
rights to their work.8 5
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to whom all the revision
bills were submitted, weighed the various arguments, and while recogniz-
ing that the bargaining power of screenwriters was at stake, determined
that "the practical benefits that individual authors would receive [by us-
ing the "shop right" doctrine] are highly conjectural."8 6 To exchange
the longstanding policy that initial ownership rights vested in the em-
ployer for the shop right doctrine, would create uncertainties and raise
other issues of dispute.8 7 In an effort to reconcile the conflicts between
the needs of the hiring parties and recognizing that certain specially com-
missioned works could be considered works for hire, the 1965 bill
changed the definition of a "work made for hire" to:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture,
as a translation, or as a supplementary work, if the parties
expressly agree in writing that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire. 8
82. Id.
83. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1966).
84. Id.
85. The employer is considered the author of the employee's work, and therefore the em-
ployee has no rights to the work she has produced. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
86. Id.
87. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 121 (re-
port by Mr. Kastenmeier, from the Committee on the Judiciary).
88. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION
BILL, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 (1965)[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6].
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The committee responded to the objections and concerns about the
broad inclusion of "specially ordered or commissioned" works, and de-
termined that the four special cases specifically mentioned were more apt
to be treated as work for hire due to the process of creating the works. 89
In the cases of translations, maps, illustrations and encyclopedias, and
certain portions of motion pictures, the free-lancers work at the direction
of the hiring party, and because the hiring party bears all the risk, to
exclude these areas from the work for hire provision would have been
unfair. 9o The committee did clearly state "other works made on special
order or commission would not come within the definition." 9 1 Whether
this was in reference to clause one or two of the definition is the question
that has plagued courts working to determine the scope of the work for
hire definition.
Before the enactment of the Revised Act, the second clause of the
work made for hire definition was expanded to include five more types of
work and the current definition reads:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplemen-
tary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a
test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the par-
ties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.92
The final framing of the work for hire provision was intended to
draw a statutory line between works written on special order or commis-
sion, that should not be considered works for hire, and those works that
should.93 The specific categories enumerated in Section 101(2), were the
categories of commissioned works that could be considered works for
hire in certain instances.94
89. Id. at 67.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 68.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
93. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 121 (re-
port by Mr. Kastenmeier, from the Committee on Judiciary).
94. Id.
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IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORK FOR HIRE
DEFINITION OF THE REVISED ACT
After the Revised Act took effect in 1978, courts began to interpret
the various provisions of copyright ownership. With the new definition
of works for hire, many questions of copyright were no longer disputed.
However, while the Revised Act provided that certain commissioned
works were deemed works for hire only if there was written agreement by
the parties, it still remained unclear how other commissioned works were
to be considered.95 Three cases decided after the enactment of the Re-
vised Act illustrate the split between the circuits as to how commissioned
works, not enumerated in the Act, have been designated when determin-
ing copyright ownership.
A. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegal Inc. - The Second Circuit
In Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel Inc.,96 the Second Circuit stated
that when the commissioner of a work "actively supervised and directed
the creation of [the work]" an employer/employee relationship would be
supported even when the party producing the work did not fall into the
regular employee category. 97 The court stated that it could find no indi-
cation in the legislative history that Section 101(2) was meant to refer to
contractors who were actually sufficiently supervised and directed by the
hiring party to be considered "employee" acting within "the scope of
their employment."98 The court stated that Section 101(2) only framed
the issue and therefore independent contractors were governed accord-
ingly: a free-lance party could be "so controlled and supervised in the
creation of the particular work by the employing party that an employer-
employee relationship exists."9 9 By adopting this view, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that Section 101(1) of the Revised Act was not intended to
apply only to "traditional" employees.l °° Based on this interpretation,
the court concluded that the jury properly found an employer/employee
95. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
96. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 105 S.Ct 387 (1984). In this case the Second
Circuit was called on to settle a dispute between a third party, Speigel, and Aldon Accessories,
the commissioning party. Id. Aldon Accessories had commissioned miniature unicorns to be
produced by a Japanese company in Japan. Id. at 549. Aldon Accessories then argued that
similar unicorns being sold through Speigel catalogs infringed on Aldon's copyright. Id. Spei-
gel responded that Aldon was not the copyright owner under the work for hire provision
because the unicorns did not fit under Section 101, clause 2. Id. at 551.
97. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 387 (1984)("Aldon Accessories").
98. Id. at 552.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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relationship based on the actual amount of supervision and direction as-
serted by the employer and thus ownership vested in the commissioning
party.I
01
The Second Circuit had ruled similarly before and after the legisla-
tive compromise regarding works for hire. 12 Based on the Original Act,
the Second Circuit developed a presumption that the buyer was intended
to hold the copyright." 3 While Congress' definition delineated specific
categories of commissioned works to be considered works for hire, the
Second Circuit expanded the presumption that the buyer has ownership
to work for hire situations regardless of the employee/independent con-
tractor status.1 4 Because of this interpretation, and the fact that no
mention was made in the legislation striking down the Second Circuit's
treatment of commissioned works, the confusion in construing the work
for hire provision has been perpetuated.0 5
The Second Circuit's approach to commissioned works that fall
outside of the categories enumerated in Section 101(2), has been assessed
in different ways. It has been stated that the Aldon Accessories holding-
that actual control is the basis for determining the parties' status-fills a
"vacuum left by congressional silence on the treatment of most commis-
sioned works."'0 6 However, the decision also serves to break down the
distinction between employees and independent contractors. Through
the course of producing the work, if the employer asserts enough actual
control the employer will then be considered the author for purposes of
copyright.'o7
The Aldon Accessories test, while potentially justifiable based on the
101. Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 553. "There was evidence that [the commissioning
party] actively supervised and directed the creation of ... [the] statuettes. While he did not
physically wield the sketching pen and sculpting tools, he stood over the artists and artisans at
critical stages of the process, telling them exactly what to do. He was, in a very real sense the
artistic creator." Id.
102. See Brattleboro Pub. Corp. v. Winmill Pub. Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
103. Easter Seal Soc. v. Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1987), referring to
Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940)( "Easter Seal').
104. Id. at 326; See Brattleboro Pub. Corp. v. Winmill Pub. Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1966).
105. See, Hamilton, Commissioned Works As Works Made For Hire Under the 1976 Copy-
right Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1284-89 (1987)(discussion
regarding the line of cases in which the Second Circuit followed the presumption that owner-
ship vests in the employer).
106. Casenote, Copyright Law-The Work Made for Hire Doctrine: Incentive and Con-
cern-Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D. C. Cir.), cert. granted,
109 S.Ct. 362 (1988), 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 377, 399 (1989).
107. See Note, The Works Made for Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of 1976 - A
Misinterpretation: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 649, 669 (Spring 1986).
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facts of the case,' 08 has been followed in situations where the actual con-
trol test has become more of a right to control test.'" The Fourth and
Seventh Circuits have altered the test by applying it in cases with less
compelling evidence that the hiring party has asserted actual control."°
B. Easter Seal Society v. Playboy - The Fifth Circuit
In 1987, the Fifth Circuit ruled in Easter Seal Society for Crippled
Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises 'l that the
Revised Act greatly restricted the scope of the work for hire doctrine.' 2
To define the scope of work for hire, the Easter Seal court held that "a
work is 'made for hire' within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976
if and only if the seller is an employee within the meaning of agency law,
or the buyer and seller comply with the requirements of Section
10 1(2)."'" To reach this decision, the court examined the case law prior
to and following the Revised Act. 1" 4 The court recognized that there
was a presumption that whenever authorship services were purchased,
the seller was considered the employee and the buyer was considered the
author according to the statute.' '" After examining the Revised Act, the
Fifth Circuit rejected that presumption and said for the purposes of
copyright ownership, "A 'buyer' is the putative legal employer claiming
ownership under the 'work for hire' doctrine. Similarly, a 'seller' is the
person against whom a buyer claims, whether an employee or an in-
dependent contractor.""' 6 By rejecting the presumption, the court then
offered what it considered the literal interpretation of the work for hire
definition.' Following the literal terms of the Revised Act, ownership
108. See supra note 95.
109. See Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 949 (1986).
110. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334 (referring to Evans v. Newton, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.
1986)). Cited in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1491 (D.C.
Cir. 1988). See also Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410
(4th Cir. 1987).
111. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987). The court in this case was called on to settle a dispute
between the hiring party, Easter Seal, and Playboy Enterprises, who had obtained and used
videotape that was initially used in the National Easter Seal Telethon. Id. at 324. Because
entertainer Ronnie Kole, representing Easter Seal, had participated in the production process,
they argued that they were owners of the videotape under the work for hire doctrine, not the
television station that had produced the tape and then submitted it to Playboy. Id. at 324-25.
112. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 324.
113. Id. at 334-35.
114. Id. at 326-27.
115. Id. at 327.
116. Id. at 329.
117. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334.
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would only vest in the buyer if the seller is an employee under the terms
of agency law,' 1 8 therefore the presumption that all sellers were employ-
ees was no longer viable. The court found its interpretation consistent
with the intent of the statute since the "scope of employment" provision
of section 101 is "virtually a term of art in agency law. '""I9
Easter Seal is viewed as the seminal case establishing the "literal
interpretation" of the work for hire provision. 20 Authority on copyright
has recognized, as the Fifth Circuit did, that the presence of the phrase
"scope of employment" showed the drafters' intent to follow the general
law of agency when defining the term "employee."'' However, as the
Fifth Circuit noted, the literal interpretation does have flaws. The court
felt that by using this definition, they may have veered too far from the
Original Act's use of the phrase.'22 However, authority has stated that
the legislative history prior to the Revised Act supports the view that
commissioned works were not to be treated in the same manner as works
created by employees. 23 Therefore a clear distinction was intended.
The critics have also argued that the literal interpretation adopted in
Easter Seal is an extremist view that will keep employers from hiring
outside contractors.124 The concern is that employers will use their em-
ployees, over whose works they are virtually guaranteed copyright own-
ership rights, rather than using non-employees with whom there are no
guarantees. 125  Despite these concerns the "literal interpretation" ap-
proach has been supported by the courts.
126
118. Id at 335.
119. Id. The court noted that "[a]lthough there is no general federal agency law and adopt-
ing state agency law would not give copyright law the requisite national uniformity, federal
courts can turn to early copyright cases before the Yardley rule, [which presumed to make
copyright "employees" out of independent contractors,] and to the general principles embod-
ied in the Restatement of Agency Law." Id.
120. Casenote, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine.: Incentive and Concern-Community for
Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D. C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988),
62 TEMPLE L. REV. 377, 386 (1989).
121. M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B][1] (1989).
122. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 335 ("We recognize that this interpretation is a radical break
from the 'work for hire' doctrine under the 1909 Act, but there are good reasons for this break
.... .).
123. Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright
Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (1987).
124. See supra note 120, at 394.
125. Only if the parties expressly agree otherwise will ownership vest in the employee and
not the employer according to § 201(b). 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
126. See, e.g., Reid II, 846 F.2d at 1494.
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C. Dumas v. Gommerman - The Ninth Circuit
In January 1989, the Ninth Circuit construed the work for hire pro-
vision of Section 101 for the first time.'27 In Dumas v. Gommerman, 1
28
the Ninth Circuit concluded that "only works produced by formal, sala-
ried employees are covered by 17 U.S.C. Section 101(1). Works by in-
dependent contractors are to be considered works for hire only when the
requirements of 17 U.S.C. Section 101(2) are satisfied."' 129 In the course
of reaching this conclusion, the court noted its approval of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of work for hire in Easter Seal, which followed the
common law agency theory.' 3o However, the court concluded that the
application of an agency law reading of employee "indirectly includes the
rejected 'supervision and control' test [used by the Second Circuit], be-
cause agency law considers relevant the extent of control which ... the
master may exercise over the details of the work."'' The Ninth Circuit
reached its own conclusion after reviewing the legislative process and de-
termining that the drafters did not intend to follow the agency law defini-
tion.132 The Dumas court concluded that because the work for hire
provision implicitly destroyed the artist's right to terminate the transfer
of his work, the drafters felt it was necessary to have a bright line be-
tween employees and independent contractors to prevent mistakes over
the status of the contracted work. 133 It followed that only formal sala-
ried employees should be considered employees according to the work
for hire provision. 131
The court believed this interpretation gave effect to the intent behind
the Revised Act and would prevent disputes between the authors of the
works and the parties who commissioned the works. 135 Following the
agency law theory, disputes initially would arise regarding an author's
status as an employee or as an independent contractor, and then proceed
from that point.
At the time the Ninth Circuit ruled in Dumas, there was support for
127. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1989)("Dumas').
128. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). In this case, Jennifer Dumas, the widow and successor
in interest to copyrights held by Patrick Nagel, brought an action against Stefan Gommerman,
the owner of a Los Angeles art gallery. Id. at 1094. Ms. Dumas contended that Patrick Nagel
was an independent contractor when he produced the works for a client, who then sold the
copyrights to Gommerman. Id.
129. Id. at 1105
130. Id. at 1103.
131. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958)).
132. Id. at 1104.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1104.
135. Id. at 1104-05.
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the interpretation that only salaried employees were to be considered
under Section 101(1). One commentator had stated that only salaried, or
likely situated, employees should be considered under Section 101(1), re-
gardless of how closely an independent contractor's work was supervised
and controlled. 36 It was also noted that this interpretation is most con-
sistent with the formal definition of employee, despite the presence of the
term "scope of employment." '37 However, in 1985, in response to a Sen-
ate bill suggesting changes to the work for hire provision of the Revised
Act, the Copyright Office succinctly stated that "employee" was not in-
tended to mean regular or salaried employees. 38 The Copyright Office
has since changed its position and adopted a "purist position" which sup-
ports a clear distinction between the employee and the independent
contractor. 139
The Dumas interpretation currently stands as the most favorable in-
terpretation of "employee" for free-lancers, and thus is the position sup-
ported by numerous organizations supporting creators' rights."4
V. COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE V. REID
A. The District Court
In February 1987, CCNV and Reid argued their opposing positions
on work for hire in the United States District Court in the District of
Columbia. 41 The district court recognized that ownership of the copy-
right turned on the statutory identification of "author," which in turn
depended on whether the piece was considered a work for hire.' 42 While
Section 101(1) states that works meet the definition only when they are
produced by employees within the scope of their employment, the dis-
trict court declined to follow the master-servant relationship found in the
common law of agency, and instead interpreted employee more
broadly.'43 Thus, if the putative employer was either the "motivating
force" or "possessed the right to direct and supervise the work," the
136. Easter Seal, 846 F.2d at 1492 (citing W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW
122 (6th ed. 1986)).
137. Raysman & Brown, Conflicting Standards in Work-for-Hire Situations, N.Y.L.J., May
10, 1989, at 3.
138. Hartnick, The "Community" Case and Work for Hire, N.Y.L.J., February 10, 1989, at
5.
139. Id. at 6.
140. Goldberg, Works for Hire Resolved?, N.Y.L.J., July 21, 1989, at 3.
141. Reid I, 652 F. Supp. 1453.
142. Id. at 1456.
143. Id.
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commissioning party would be considered the owner of the copyright."
The district court found support for this position in Aldon Accessories
and a Fifth Circuit decision that followed a variation of the "actual con-
trol" test.'45
Using this expansive definition of work for hire, the court then de-
termined that plaintiff CCNV was the motivating force behind the work
and additionally that CCNV "directed enough of [Reid's] effort to assure
that, in the end, he had produced what they, not he, wanted, notwith-
standing his creative instincts may have been in harmony with theirs."' 46
Therefore, Reid was considered an employee " 'regardless of whether he
[was] paid on the basis of a conventional periodic salary, on a piece work
basis, on a fee or royalty basis, or even if [he works] as an accommoda-
tion with no compensation at all.' "147 Thus, CCNV was considered the
exclusive owner of the copyright in "Third World America" under the
definition of work for hire.'48 Reid appealed. 4 9
B. The Appellate Court
The appellate court rejected the district court's broad reading of the
work for hire provision, and ruled consistently with the Fifth Circuit in
Easter Seal on the issue of Reid's status as either an employee or an
independent contractor.150 The court examined rulings from the Second
and Seventh Circuits which followed the actual control test, and varia-
tions thereof, for determining the status of employee.'' The appellate
court noted that Aldon Accessories examined Section 101(1) and deter-
mined that it was intended to follow case law prior to the enactment of
the Revised Act.'52 On that premise the Second Circuit ruled that in-
dependent contractors should be viewed as employees for the purposes of
work for hire if they were " 'sufficiently supervised and directed by the
hiring party.' "'"" The appellate court in Reid determined that while the
facts of Aldon Accessories compelled the use of the "actual control" test,
it had the potential to become a "right to control" test. ' 4 The appellate
144. Id.
145. Reid I, 652 F. Supp. at 1456.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5:03[B][1][a] (1985)).
148. Id. at 1457.
149. Reid II 846 F.2d 1485.
150. Id. at 1487.
151. See, supra notes 95-109.
152. Reid II, 846 F.2d at 1490.
153. Id.
154. Reid II 846 F.2d at 1491. See Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334.
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court cited Evans v. Newton, 155 where the Seventh Circuit attempted to
follow the actual control test.15 6 In Evans, the court did not have the
substantial factual showing of supervision and control that the Aldon Ac-
cessories court had when it applied the actual control test.' 57 The appel-
late court in Reid further noted that the district court below also had
combined the actual control and the right to control tests when it deter-
mined that Reid was considered an employee.' 58
Not satisfied with this multi-test interpretation, the appellate court
turned to the "literal interpretation."' 59 The court concluded that the
ruling by the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal was the most consistent with
the intent of the Revised Act."6 Therefore, under Section 101(1), a
party was considered an employee only if he or she met the agency law
standard.1 6' Consequently, the work of an independent contractor was a
work for hire only if it fell into one of the enumerated categories in Sec-
tion 101(2), and the parties expressly agreed to sign a written instrument
consistent with that intent.
162
Following the literal interpretation approach to the work for hire
definition, the court determined that the sculpture "Third World
America" did not qualify as a work made for hire. 63 The appellate court
pointed out that Reid was a fine artist who donated his services for this
one occasion and all the work was done at his studios by assistants that
he personally hired. "I Additionally, the court stated that CCNV was
not in the regular business of creating sculptures. 65 Based on these
facts, Reid could not be considered an employee under common law
agency theory and, therefore, he was considered an independent contrac-
tor. Thus copyright ownership to his work did not transfer to CCNV
under the work for hire provision.' 66 CCNV appealed to the Supreme
155. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
156. Reid I, 846 F.2d at 1491.
157. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334; See Evans v. Newton, 793 F.2d at 892-93 (facts of the
case).
158. Reid II, 846 F.2d at 1493.
159. Id. at 1492.
160. Id. at 1494.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Reid II, 846 F.2d at 1494.
164. Id. at 1494 n.il.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1494. While the appellate court ruled that CCNV was not the author, they did
not conclude that Reid was sole owner of the copyright in "Third World America." The issue
of joint ownership was remanded to the district court for a ruling consistent with the appellate
court's holding. Id. at 1499.
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Court. 1
6 7
C. The Supreme Court
In June 1989, an unanimous Supreme Court handed down the rul-
ing which was intended to "resolve a conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals over the proper construction of the 'work made for hire' provision
of the [Revised] Act."' 68 The Court recognized that the interpretation of
the work for hire definition has a great impact on free-lance creators and
for the industries commissioning their works. 169 Not only does the clas-
sification of a work determine its initial ownership, but special provisions
to work for hire have also been established with regard to the copyright's
duration, the owners' renewal rights, termination rights and the right to
import goods bearing the copyright. 70  Based on its vast effect, the
Supreme Court welcomed and received numerous amicus briefs support-
ing the opposing positions. 7'
Dispositive to the above considerations concerning ownership is the
initial determination that a work is, in fact, a work for hire. To deter-
mine the meaning of "employee" and "scope of employment," the Court
looked at the existing interpretations.
The first interpretation examined "holds that a work is prepared by
an employee whenever the hiring party retains the right to control the
product."' 7 '2 The Supreme Court determined that this first interpretation
distorted the intended meaning of Section 101(2). This interpretation
would allow any work that is specially ordered or commissioned to be-
come a work for hire if it is subject to the supervision and control of the
hiring party.' The Supreme Court ruled that this ignored the dichot-
omy that Congress expressly established between Section 101(1) and Sec-
tion 101(2), by allowing works that should reach work for hire status
through the enumerations in prong two, plus a signed agreement, to be
determined works for hire under prong one.)7
The second interpretation was the "actual control" test discussed in
167. Reid 1, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989).
168. Id at 2170-71.
169. Id. at 2171.
170. Id
171. Hartnick, Independent Contractors in the Software, Magazine Industries, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 3, 1989, at 5. For example, briefs were submitted by the Intellectual Property Owners
and the Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Association on behalf of CCNV. The
Solicitor General and the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., with the consent of Barbara
Ringer, the former register of copyrights, submitted briefs on behalf of Reid. Id.
172. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2172 (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 2173.
174. Id.
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Aldon Accessories. This test allowed for works by independent contrac-
tors that could fall into Section 101(2) if there was a signed agreement,
additionally to be considered works for hire if the commissioning party
exerted a great deal of control through the process of creating the
work. 7 5 The Court could not find "statutory support for an additional
dichotomy between commissioned works that are actually controlled and
supervised by the hiring party and those that are not."'176 It was clear,
according to the Court, that through the entire process of negotiating
and compromising to reach the current definition of work for hire, it was
always the intent of the parties that "works by employees and commis-
sioned works by independent contractors [were] separate entities."'' 77 On
that basis, the "actual control" test, which blurred the line between em-
ployees and independent contractors, could not be supported by the lan-
guage or structure of Section 101.178 The appellate court in Reid had
noted that the first and second interpretations were problematic because
they were easily interchangeable.
179
The Court then determined that the statutory language of Section
101 supported the proposition that "classification of a particular hired
party should be made with reference to agency law."' 180 This was the
"literal interpretation" adopted in Easter Seal 181 Recognizing that stat-
utory terms alone cannot show their intended meaning, the court looked
to the negotiations that had occurred in reaching the present wording to
determine how the clause should be read.' 2 Based on the 1965 compro-
mise, the Court determined that, in response to concerns of parties on
both sides of the issue, Congress still intended to "provide two mutually
exclusive ways for works to acquire work for hire status: one for employ-
175. The respondent's brief also noted that a "perverse result" could occur with the appli-
cation of the "actual control" test:
Under the [Aldon Accessories actual control] test a perverse result would be reached
in the common situation in which a traditional, salaried employee works on a copy-
rightable project without any specific direction and supervision by his or her em-
ployer. Using the Aldon [Accessories] test, such a work created without the
employer's direction and supervision, even if created within the scope of employ-
ment, would not be deemed a work for hire in the absence of actual direction and
supervision. Works thus created would not be owned by the employer but by the
employee.
Brief for Respondent, No. 88-293, at 21.
176. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct at 2174.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
180. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2174.
181. See supra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 48-94 and accompanying text.
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ees and the other for independent contractors."' 83 Furthermore, that
since specific areas of works were enumerated in clause two of the defini-
tion, only those enumerated works were to be "accorded work for hire
status," when created by independent contractors.1
84
Based on that conclusion, the Court determined:
Transforming a commissioned work into a work by an em-
ployee on the basis of the hiring party's right to control, or ac-
tual control of, the work is inconsistent with the language,
structure, and legislative history of the work for hire provi-
sions. To determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a
court first should ascertain, using principles of general common
law of agency, whether the work was prepared by an employee
or an independent contractor.'85
Using the common law of agency test, the Court examined a number of
factors. The factors included: the hiring parties right to control the pro-
ject; the skills required of the free-lancer; the source of the tools used to
create the work; the location where the work was done; the duration of
the working relationship between the parties; the hiring parties right to
assign additional projects and the method of payment. 86 Using these
factors, the Supreme Court then turned to Reid's status in this instance.
The Court weighed the following facts: CCNV asserted control over the
project; Reid was practicing a skilled occupation and supplying his own
tools; Reid did the work in his own studio; Reid was hired especially for
this project and only for this project; Reid was only retained for two
months and payment was dependent on completion of the statue.'
87
While the court recognized that CCNV had directed enough of Reid's
work to ensure that the end product met their requirements, that factor
is not dispositive under the agency test. '88 Weighing all these factors, the
Court concluded that all circumstances, other than the assertion of con-
trol, "weigh[ed] heavily against finding an employment relationship." 89
Therefore, Reid could not be considered an employee of CCNV.' 9
183. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2176.
184. Id. at 2176-77.
185. Id. at 2178.
186. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2178-79.
187. Id. at 2179.
188. Id. (no one of these factors is determinative).
189. Id.
190. Id. Though the Court determined the CCNV was not the author of the sculpture
according to the work for hire provision, there still remained the issue of joint ownership. This
still remained for the district court to rule on consistent with the appellate court's order. Id. at
2180.
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While the Supreme Court cited Dumas in the course of its opinion,
it did not address the proposition that only formal, salaried employees
ought to be considered employees under Section 101(1). In its amicus
curiae brief to the court, the Copyright Office, through the Solicitor Gen-
eral, recommended that the Court adopt the interpretation limiting "em-
ployee" to formal salaried employees.' 91 Reid also urged the Court to
recognize the Dumas test and enumerated the numerous opinions that
supported this position. 92 The Court did acknowledge that the drafters
intended clear distinctions between employees and independent contrac-
tors and that Congress' paramount goal when enacting the Revised Act
was to enhance predictability and certainty of copyright owners-hip. 9
However, the Court was not willing to go beyond the common law
agency theory.
VI. IS THE DISPUTE RESOLVED?
While the Supreme Court recognized that no federal law exists gov-
erning agency theory, the Court decided the agency law interpretation
was the most consistent with the statute and would effect the purpose of
the Revised Act. How this interpretation will actually impact parties
who are not formal salaried employees and whether this interpretation
will be accepted remains to be seen.
The decision is considered a victory for free-lance artists.194 Now if
a photographer does not meet the requisites of common law agency the-
ory, he will retain copyright ownership of his products. If the software
191. Statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights and Assistant Librarian for Copy-
right Services before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., September 20, 1989. Prepared statement, p. 3.
Students of the Supreme Court have pointed out that in difficult cases, the Court has often
adopted the view of the Solicitor General. Groner, Why Big Business Likes Mitch Snyder,
Legal Times, January 16, 1989, at 7.
192. Respondents Brief, at 26-27. The Respondent's Brief listed the following works that
support the position that only formal salaried employees should be considered within Section
101(1): Fidlow, The "Works Made for Hire" Doctrine and the Employee/Independent Con-
tractor Dichotomy: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
591, 619 (1988); Galley, Authorship and Copyright of "Works Made for Hire": Bugs in the
Statutory System, 8 ART & LAW 573, 581 (1984); Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works
Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1281, 1313 (1987); Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment - What Congress
Really Intended, 35 J. COPR. Soc. 210 (April 1988); Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Leg-
islative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 890 (1987). Id.
193. Reid III, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2177.
194. Ossola, High Court Decides Who "Works for Hire," Legal Times, June 12, 1989, at 19
(Charles Ossola filed an amicus brief in the Reid case on behalf of the American Society of
Magazine Photographers and the Copyright Justice Coalition, a group of 50 organizations
which represent free-lance creators).
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creator brings his experience, tools and only agrees to a single project, he
can argue that he is not an employee under common law agency theory.
Further, if an architect drafts a building for a contractor and simply
turns over the prints, he will not lose copyright to his design under the
work for hire provision. However, there is still no concrete rule for free-
lancers. The free-lancers' victory stems from the fact that under agency
law their conduct, skill and method of working will weigh into the test to
determine whether they are employees.19 Under the "actual control"
test or the "right to control" test the primary determination of the free-
lancer's status was based on the action of the hiring party. The agency
law theory allows additional considerations to be balanced when the cre-
ator's status is being determined. However, there is still room for
uncertainty.
Because of the continued uncertainty that follows the agency law
theory for defining employee, the Supreme Court clearly failed to go far
enough in its decision. The Court could have ended litigation in these
areas by following the position adopted in Dumas. The Dumas position
is supported by many commentators and by new legislation before the
Senate. 196
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Law, a number of bills
have been proposed to alter the definition of works for hire.197 The deci-
sion in Reid did not end the efforts to amend the work for hire provision.
On June 22, 1989, just two weeks after the Supreme Court held that
agency law determined whether a party was an employee under Section
101(1), a bill proposing to amend the copyright law regarding work made
for hire was submitted to the Senate. The intent of Senate Bill 1253, in
pertinent part, is to limit the definition of "employee" in Section 101(1)
to apply only to formal salaried employees.9 " Senator Cochran intro-
195. See supra note 186.
196. See supra note 192.
197. See Note, The Works Made for Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of 1976 - A
Misinterpretation: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 649, 673 n.121
(discussion of the various bills that have been proposed to redefine the work for hire provision);
e.g., DEFINITION OF WORK MADE FOR HIRE IN THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, S. 2044, 1986
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 20,366.
198. "That section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended - by amending clause (1)
and the first sentence of clause (2) of the definition, "work made for hire" to read as follows:
(1) a work, other than a specially ordered or commissioned work, prepared by a
formal salaried employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture ... if, with respect to each such work,
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them before the com-
mencement of the work, that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Text of S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
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duced this bill because he believed that the work for hire provision
should be modified to "assure that work made for hire is confined to the
limits that Congress intended when it enacted the 1976 amendments."' 99
As with the hearings prior to the enactment of the Revised Act,
various interested parties continue to present their positions on the work
for hire provisions.2 °° Unlike the prior bills seeking changes in the work
for hire provision, testimony regarding the most recent bill has occurred
subsequent to the Supreme Court interpretation of the pertinent phrases.
Recognizing that "employee" is now defined under common law agency
theory, some parties are not convinced that this is a satisfactory
interpretation.
The Copyright Office has reasserted its position that only formal
salaried employees should be considered under Section 101(l).2"1 They
consider this a more suitable interpretation than the common law agency
theory which does not provide certainty in business relationships.20 2 In-
stead of allowing ownership determinations to be made after the fact,
based on balancing the factors under the common law agency status for
the creator, the formal salaried definition ensures that a determination as
to copyright ownership is made upon commencement of the working re-
lationship.2"3 The formal salaried definition is also supported by other
organizations on the grounds that a clear, objective definition is a neces-
sary step towards achieving a fair balance between the rights of creators
and the hiring parties. 2"
Publishers and other hiring parties oppose any changes in the word-
ing of Section 101(l).205 Two reasons are asserted for rejecting the inclu-
sion of "formal salaried" into the work for hire definition.2 °6 First, it is
argued that because the Supreme Court unanimously voted to support
the common law agency definition, the Court rejected the proposition
199. Statement of Senator Thad Cochran before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks, September 20, 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 5.
200. See infra notes 201-09.
201. Statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights and Assistant Librarian for Copy-
right Services before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, September 20, 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., Prepared Statement, at 3,
12.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 15.
204. Statement of Richard Weisgrau, on Behalf of the Copyright Justice Coalition in Sup-
port of S. 1253, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Sep-
tember 20, 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., Prepared Statement, at 6.
205. See Copyright Moral Rights: Work Made for Hire (S. 1253), Judiciary Subcommittee
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks Hearing, September 20, 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
Testimony of Michael Klipper representing the Committee for American Copyrights, at 28.
206. Id. at 27-28.
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that Section 101(1) be interpreted only to include formal, salaried em-
ployees.2 °7 Second, it is argued that the impact of the Supreme Court's
interpretation has not yet been assessed.2"8 Until the businesses using
free-lancers have determined the effect of the Supreme Court ruling, it is
premature to change legislation. 2'
At present there has been no further decision on this proposed legis-
lation. However, Congress has rejected earlier bill submissions propos-
ing changes to the work for hire provision. 210 Additionally, examining
the extensive process that preceeded the Revised Act, it is unlikely that
Congress will hastily change the wording of the work for hire provision,
especially since the Supreme Court has so recently provided its
interpretation.
VII. CONCLUSION
No legislation will guarantee a balance in bargaining power that in
turn ensures an artist's, writer's or software creator's right to the copy-
right in the product he or she creates. However, while the agency law
theory provides more certainty for a creator than the actual control or
right to control tests, there is still room for disputes to arise. If the goal
of the Supreme Court was to follow the intent of Congress there is suffi-
cient support to show that the Court should have followed the ruling in
Dumas. Instead, the Court felt that it was strictly abiding by the terms
of the Revised Act by following common law agency theory.
With the agency law definition of work for hire, the Court has re-
solved the dispute between the circuits. But as organizations continue to
present their views, it is clear that the current definition is not unani-
mously accepted. Now we must wait to see if a new area of litigation
develops as parties argue whether the creators are common law employ-
ees or independent contractors.
Marita Covarrubias
207. Id.
208. Id. at 28.
209. Testimony of R. Jack Fishman, Publisher, Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copy-
rights & Trademarks of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, 10 1st Cong., 1st
Sess., Introduction.
210. See supra note 197.
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